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Delusions are often resistant to change, persisting despite successful antipsychotic treatment or Cognitive
Behavioural Therapy. This study aimed to target reasoning processes, particularly the ‘Jumping to
Conclusions’ (JTC) bias and belief ﬂexibility, which are thought to play a part in maintaining delusional
conviction.
13 participants with a diagnosis of psychosis and high levels of conviction in their delusions completed
a one-off computerised training package, lasting approximately 1.5 h. Outcomes were assessed at
baseline, pre-intervention (two weeks later), post-intervention (immediately after completing the
training) and at 1 month follow-up.
The package was well received by participants. There were improvements in JTC, belief ﬂexibility and
delusional conviction between pre- and post-intervention measures. Controlled studies powered to
detect changes in key outcomes are warranted in order to evaluate the efﬁcacy of the programme.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Delusions are particularly resistant to change, often persisting
despite antipsychotic treatment (Craig et al., 2004; Mizrahi et al.,
2006). Recent meta-analytical studies of Cognitive Behavioural
Therapy for psychosis (CBTp) have found small- to medium-sized
beneﬁcial effects on residual positive symptoms (Wykes, Steel,
Everitt, & Tarrier, 2008). It has been argued that the development
of more targeted interventions, based upon theoretical models of
single symptoms, may be a way forward (Garety et al., 2008).
Examples of interventions using this approach have found prom-
ising results for command hallucinations (Trower et al., 2004) and
persecutory delusions (Foster, Startup, Potts, & Freeman, 2010). It is
hypothesised that an intervention targeting reasoning biases,
including the ‘Jumping to Conclusions’ (JTC) bias and belief ﬂexi-
bility will reduce patients’ conviction in their delusional beliefs.
Experimental research has consistently found that people with
delusions are more likely to jump to conclusions than non-delu-
sional controls (see reviews by Fine, Gardner, Craigie, & Gold, 2007;
Freeman, 2007; Garety & Freeman, 1999). That is, in uncertain
situations they gather less information before reaching a conclusion:
they show a speciﬁc ‘data gathering bias’. The tendency to JTCx: þ44 20 7848 0976.
.
Y license.appears to be speciﬁc to the presence of delusions rather than other
psychotic symptoms or diagnosis (Freeman, Pugh, & Garety, 2008;
Garety et al., 2005; Peters, Thornton, Siksou, Linney, & McCabe,
2007), and it has been associated with the presence of inﬂexible
beliefs (Garety et al., 2005) and higher delusional conviction
(Broome et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2008; Garety et al., 2005).
Garety et al. (2005) report evidence for an association between JTC
and delusional conviction, which they found to be mediated by the
related reasoning process of belief (in)ﬂexibility. Belief ﬂexibility has
been deﬁned as, ‘the metacognitive capacity of reﬂecting on one’s own
beliefs, changing them in the light of reﬂection and evidence, and
generating and considering alternatives’ (Garety et al., 2005, p.374).
A recent study by Lincoln, Ziegler, Mehl, and Rief (2010) reported
evidence that the JTC bias may be reduced in delusional patients, to
someextent, followingprovisionof feedback, highlightingerrors and
successes in their decision-making. Training patients in the use of
‘good’ reasoning strategiesmay therefore be oneway of reducing the
JTC bias and impacting on delusional ideation. To date only a small
number of studies have aimed to manipulate reasoning biases.
Moritz andWoodward (2007a, b) report thedevelopmentof a group-
based ‘Metacognitive Training’ (MCT) package targeting a number of
cognitive processes which included JTC. Training is delivered over
eight sessions, each lasting approximately 45e60 min. In two small
pilot studies (Aghotor, Pfueller, Moritz, Weisbrod, & Roesch-Ely,
2010; Moritz & Woodward, 2007a) the intervention was found to
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a decline in both JTC andpositive symptoms, althoughmore rigorous
evaluations are warranted. Ross, Freeman, Dunn, and Garety (2009)
were the ﬁrst group to report the results of an intervention speciﬁ-
cally targeting the JTC data gathering bias. They were interested in
the short-term effects of a brief individually-delivered intervention.
Thirty-fourhigh convictiondelusional patients tookpart in thestudy,
randomlyassigned to either theexperimental group,who completed
the computerised reasoning training lasting approximately 45 min,
or the control group, who completed cognitive tasks unrelated to
reasoning. The training package aimed to ‘target data gathering,
generation and consideration of alternative ideas and the use of
conﬁrmatoryanddisconﬁrmatoryevidence’ (Ross et al., 2009, p. 4). It
comprised threemodules: twosigniﬁcantlyadapted fromMoritzand
Woodward’s (2007a) groupMCTpackage, and one newly developed.
All threemodules involved neutral, abstract tasks, with no reference
to delusions or potentially delusion-related materials. Following
training, participants in the experimental group showed a signiﬁcant
improvement in data gathering (JTC) in comparisonwith the control
group, with an effect size of 0.4 (Cohen’s d). However, this was most
prominent in those who did not JTC on baseline measurements,
suggesting that the bias is relatively robust and that lengthier
trainingmay be needed to improve reasoning in thosewho do JTC. In
the initial study the focuswas simplyon changing the reasoningbias,
however it is of interest that a small number of participants in the
experimental group also reported improvements in belief ﬂexibility
(n¼ 4) and delusional conviction (n¼ 3) following training, whereas
only one of the control participants showed similar improvements
and only in belief ﬂexibility. Overall, these ﬁndings suggest that
reasoning training may hold promise in improving key outcomes in
delusions. However, clearly more work is needed in order to further
develop the training programme, with the aim of impacting on JTC,
belief ﬂexibility and delusional conviction.
The present study aimed to extend the work of Ross et al. (2009)
through the development of a signiﬁcantly modiﬁed training pro-
gramme. Delusion-relevant material was added, emphasising the
link between JTC, belief ﬂexibility and delusional experience, with
the aim of encouraging generalisation to participants’ own beliefs.
Interactive components were included, with the aim of encour-
aging sustained interest. A handout was provided to summarise key
aspects, to act as a memory aid and to facilitate continued learning.
Finally, a follow-up session was included in order to evaluate the
impact of the training over time and on real-life situations where
JTC might previously have occurred and played a role in main-
taining delusions. As a result the training was lengthened to 1.5 h.
We report the results of a pilot study examining the acceptability
and feasibility of the programme, and its impact on reasoning, belief
ﬂexibility and delusional conviction. This type of design is recom-
mended in early-stage development of new clinical interventions
before moving to controlled trials (Medical Research Council, 2000,
2008). It was hypothesised that following training participants
would show an increase in data gathering (reduced JTC), an increase
in belief ﬂexibility and a decrease in conviction in their primary
delusion, which would be sustained at two-week follow-up. We
aimed to produce a short-term change in reasoning style even in
those with the strongest JTC reasoning bias. In contrast, it was
hypothesised that therewould be no change in these outcomes over
an initial two-week baseline period,when no intervention occurred.
2. Method
2.1. Design
An A-B design was used, incorporating two baseline and two
post-intervention measurements, completed over three meetings.Participants completed key outcome measures at all time points.
The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scales (PANSS, positive scale
only, Kay, Opler, & Lindenmayer, 1989) were administered at
baseline in order to establish the primary delusion, to allow
completion of further assessments. At baseline participants also
completed measures of positive psychotic symptoms (Psychotic
Symptoms Rating Scale (PSYRATS), Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier, &
Faragher, 1999), mood (Depression Anxiety Stress Scale, Abbrevi-
ated Version (DASS-21), Lovibond & Lovibond, 1993) and intellec-
tual functioning (Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence
(WASI), Wechsler, 1999). All assessments were completed by
a Doctoral Clinical Psychologist in Training, with a background in
research (HW), who was also the therapist delivering the pro-
gramme to participants.2.2. Participants
Psychiatrists and care-coordinators working in the South Lon-
don and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust were approached and
asked to identify individuals meeting the following inclusion
criteria: a case note diagnosis of a schizophrenia spectrum
disorder; currently experiencing paranoid delusions (deﬁned using
the criteria described by Freeman & Garety, 2000); delusions
present for at least six months. Those with a difﬁculty in spoken or
written English, organic impairment, a learning difﬁculty or
profound visual impairmentwere excluded from the study. In order
to ensure recruitment of a group with high delusional conviction,
those with less than 75% self-rated conviction were also excluded
from the study. A total of 23 people were referred to the study: two
did not wish to take part, four were unable to be contacted, and
three were excluded due to low levels of conviction in their delu-
sions. A total of 14 people were recruited for the study: six from
local community mental health teams, and the remaining nine
were recruited via a research register compiled by a local specialist
team dealing with psychosis. This number was deemed large
enough to gain an understanding of the potential feasibility and
acceptability of the training programme. Research into the devel-
opment of new CBT-based interventions frequently report similar
sample sizes in pilot studies, before moving to a larger-scale trial
(e.g. Dobkin, Allen, & Menza, 2007; Reid, Otis, Barry & Kerns, 2003;
Szigethy et al., 2004). Thirteen participants completed the study
and one participant did not attend meetings two and three so was
not included in the analysis. Participants were paid £30 for their
time and any expenses incurred over the study.2.3. Primary outcomes
2.3.1. Data gathering/‘Jumping to Conclusions’
The Probabilistic Reasoning Task (60:40 version), also known as
the ‘Beads Task’ (Garety, Hemsley, & Wessely, 1991) was used to
assess JTC reasoning style. In this task, participants were shown two
jars of beads: a ‘mainly red’ jar with 60 red beads and 40 blue beads
and a ‘mainly blue’ jar with 60 blue beads and 40 red beads (in
order to reduce possible practice effects, the colours of the beads
were changed at each different time point). The jars were subse-
quently hidden from view. Participants were told that one of the
jars would be ‘selected at random’ and beads would be drawn from
that jar. In fact the order of the beads shown is pre-determined in
order to standardise the procedure. Participants were informed
that they could see as many beads as they wish (up to a total of 20)
before making a decision about which jar they have come from, and
to only make a decision when they were sure. The number of beads
requested before making a decision was recorded and used as the
key outcome variable. Participants were rated as showing the JTC
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described by Garety et al. (2005).
2.3.2. Belief ﬂexibility
Three items were used to assess belief ﬂexibility. The ﬁrst two
items were from (or adapted from) the ‘Belief Maintenance’ scale of
the Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Schedule (MADS: Buchanan
et al., 1993), both of which have good reported inter-rater reliability
(Buchanan et al., 1993). Where more than one delusional belief had
been identiﬁed in the PANSS interview, participants were asked to
state which was most strongly held. Only the most strongly held
delusion was examined and rated in subsequent sessions.
Possibility of Being Mistaken (PBM): In the ﬁrst item, which was
the key outcome for belief ﬂexibility, participants were asked to
rate how likely it is that they are mistaken about their delusional
ideas on a visual analogue scale, ranging from 0, indicating no
possibility of being mistaken, to 100, indicating a strong possibility
that they are mistaken. This method of rating on a 100-point scale
was adapted from the original yes/no response in order to provide
continuous data.
Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction (RTHC): For the second
item, participants were given a hypothetical scenario involving
evidencewhichwas clearly inconsistentwith the delusion andwere
asked how theywould react. Participants’ responses were classiﬁed
as ‘showing ﬂexibility’ (either changing their level of conviction or
dismissing the delusion) or ‘showing inﬂexibility’ (ignoring or
rejecting the relevance of the contradictory information).
Explanations of Experiences (EoE): The third itemwas taken from
the Explanation of Experiences Assessment (Freeman et al., 2004),
which is a structured interview used to assess whether a person can
think of alternative explanations for the evidence cited in support
of the delusional belief. The number of alternative explanations was
recorded. Freeman et al. (2004) reported excellent stability of the
measure in those with similar levels of delusional conviction at
three months follow-up, and good concurrent validity.
2.3.3. Delusional conviction
Current conviction in participants’ primary delusion was
measured on a visual analogue scale, ranging from 0 to 100%, where
0% indicated no conviction in the belief and 100% indicated total
conviction.2.4. Participant feedback
Feedback was sought on participants’ views of the training,
including whether they saw any relevance to their own experiences
and what they felt they had learnt from the training.2.5. The Maudsley Review Training Programme
The computerised programme was developed on Microsoft
PowerPoint and then transferred to a Real BASIC programme to
incorporate the interactive elements. It comprised a general
introduction to JTC and ﬁve training tasks (see below). It was
designed to be completed together with a therapist, who
emphasised key messages and provided feedback on participants’
comments, for example by reinforcing useful insights and nor-
malising JTC. This was summarised, with participants’ permission,
in a handout to be taken away at the end of the session. No explicit
mention of psychosis or direct challenging of beliefs was included.
However, in order to increase relevance to delusional experience,
video clips and scenarios, with the potential for paranoid inter-
pretation, were used.2.5.1. Introduction
The introduction described the concept of JTC, highlighting that
everyone jumps to conclusions sometimes, especially in unclear or
confusing situations, and that this can lead us to make mistakes.
Participants were encouraged to think about any times when they
might have jumped to conclusions.
2.5.2. Task One: ‘What’s the picture?’
Task One was designed to introduce the idea that it can be
difﬁcult to understand a situation and reach a conclusion without
having all of the information. The main aim was therefore to teach
participants to look for more evidence before reaching a conclu-
sion, since it means that they are less likely to make mistakes. The
task was adapted from a training module in Moritz and
Woodward’s (2007a) MCT package, and was also used in the Ross
et al. (2009) study. Participants were shown a series of six
pictures, revealed one piece at a time over eight slides. After seeing
each piece they were able to either see another piece or decide
what the picture was, from a choice of six options. The task was
designed so that all options seemed plausible initially, but as more
pieces were revealed certain options could be ruled out and it
became clearer what the picture actually was.
During the training phase, participants were shown all the
pieces they could have seen (i.e. all available evidence) and were
given speciﬁc advice depending on when they chose to decide. For
example, if they decided after seeing only a small number of slides
they were told, ‘That was quite a quick decision! Making decisions
without much information can lead to mistakes. Next time try looking
at more pieces before coming to a decision’. Participants were then
shown the picture piece by piece and how to eliminate options one
at a time.
2.5.3. Task Two: ‘illusions’
Task Two, which was adapted from Ross et al.’s (2009) study,
was designed to introduce the idea that things are not always as
they ﬁrst seem, and that sometimes we only see part of the story,
which can lead us to JTC and make mistakes. The main aim of the
task was to teach participants to slow down in order to think more
carefully about other ways of seeing the situation. Participants were
shown a series of optical illusions and were asked to state what
they saw. During the training phase, participants were encouraged
to take their time and think carefully about other possible ways of
viewing the picture before coming to a conclusion.
2.5.4. Task Three: ‘ﬁrst Impressions’
Task Three was designed to highlight that things are not always
as they ﬁrst seem in real life and that not seeing the full story can
lead us to JTC and make mistakes, which can impact on our feelings
and behaviour. Participants were shown a series of three video
clips. The beginning of the clip was a brief extract, designed tomake
the observer JTC. Participants were asked to state what they
thought was happening in the clip and rate how sure they were
about this judgement, on a 0e100% scale. During the training phase
the full clip was shown, which provided an alternative explanation.
Participants were asked to think about whether they jumped to
conclusions and whether anyone else in the scene did. Participants
were reminded that in real-life things are not always as they ﬁrst
seem and that sometimes we only see part of the story which can
lead us to JTC.
2.5.5. Task Four: ‘looking for other possible explanations’
Task Four was designed to introduce the idea of thinking ﬂexibly
about alternative explanations before reaching a conclusion.
Participants were given three scenarios, each with potential for
a paranoid interpretation. For example, in scenario one, participants
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someone seems to be pointing and staring in their direction. A short
video clip illustrating each scenario was presented. After seeing
each clip, participants were asked to think about possible expla-
nations for each scenario, and were prompted to think about
neutral, positive and negative interpretations (e.g. ‘What might you
think if you were feeling scared or worried?’). They were also given
the option of seeing some ideas, already devised by the researcher
(e.g. ‘They have mistaken you for someone else’; ‘They are angry with
something you have done’). During the training phase, participants
were given the option to search for more evidence in the form of
three further video clips. For example in scenario one they were
shown the original clip again, a close-up picture of the person, and
ﬁnally a clip of the camera panning around to reveal a television
showing sports behind them. Participants were then asked to pick
which of their explanations seemed most likely. Finally they were
told howpeoplemight have jumped to conclusions in that situation,
given the paranoid interpretation, and suggested that this could
impact negatively on their feelings and behaviour. If participants
suggested very paranoid interpretations this was gently highlighted
and it was suggested that thinking about possible neutral expla-
nations could help them to see the situation differently and feel less
threatened as a result. Examples of the slides from Task Four are
presented in Fig. 1.
2.5.6. Task Five: ‘JTC summary’
Task Five was designed to be somewhat light-hearted as a ﬁnal
task, but also to refresh the main training points from the previous
tasks. Participants were shown four humorous video clips where
one character jumps to a conclusion. After seeing the clip, partici-
pants were asked to decide which character jumped to conclusions,
from a choice of three options. Next they were asked how the
character might have avoided jumping to conclusions, and were
prompted using the main training points.
2.6. Statistical analysis
All statistical analyses were completed using SPSS for Windows,
version 15. The main analysis of the three primary outcomes (data
gathering (JTC), belief ﬂexibility (PBM only), delusional conviction)
was conducted in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, a series of one-way
within-subjects ANOVAs were calculated for each primary
outcome, with planned repeated contrasts. The purpose of this
stage was to conﬁrm that there was no change between baseline 1
and 2 measurements and between post-intervention 1 and 2
measurements, as was hypothesised. Following this, mean baseline
and mean post-intervention period scores were computed for each
of the key outcomes, and a second series of one-way within-
subjects ANOVAs was calculated, including effect sizes (Cohen’s d;
Dunlap, Cortina, Vaslow, & Burke, 1996), in order to test whether
primary outcomes showed change following reasoning training. As
a check for sensitivity of the results to skew, non-parametric
methods were also used, but the results remained unaltered. For
the two non-continuous belief ﬂexibility items (RTHC and EoE), raw
change in ﬂexibility was examined.
3. Results
3.1. Baseline demographic and clinical characteristics
A summary of the demographic and clinical characteristics of
participants is provided in Table 1. Participants were from a variety
of ethnic backgrounds, but were mainly White and Black African.
There was an approximately equal number of males and females,
and the mean age was 44.6 years. 46.2% of participants wereclassiﬁed as showing the JTC bias and all reported taking antipsy-
chotic medication. The intellectual functioning of the sample as
a whole fell within the low average range (mean full scale
IQ ¼ 88.93, sd ¼ 16.43), which is comparable to that reported in
research in a similar population (Ross et al., 2009; Sheitman et al.,
2000). In terms of clinical characteristics, participants reported
high levels of positive symptoms and symptoms of depression,
anxiety and stress, all of which were comparable with previous
research in a similar population (Haddock et al., 1999; Ross et al.,
2009).
3.2. Main analysis: stage 1
A summary of mean data on the key outcomes across the four
measured time points is displayed in Table 2. Baseline data on all
outcomes was comparable with that of Ross et al. (2009). The two,
non-continuous, belief ﬂexibility items (RTHC and EoE) and clas-
siﬁcation of JTC status were not analysed statistically.
A series of planned comparisons between the four time points
was conducted for all key outcomes in order to assess differences
between speciﬁc time points. As predicted, there were no signiﬁ-
cant differences between scores at baseline 1 and 2 or between
post-intervention 1 and 2 on any of the three key outcomes.
However, when comparing baseline 2 and post-intervention 1
measurements (i.e. immediately before and after training) there
were indications of improvements at post-intervention 1 on the
number of beads requested (F(1,12) ¼ 4.55, p ¼ 0.05), belief ﬂexi-
bility: PBM (F(1,12) ¼ 7.36, p ¼ 0.02) and delusional conviction (F
(1,12) ¼ 3.57, p ¼ 0.08).
3.3. Main analysis: stage 2
Having conﬁrmed that there were no differences within baseline
andpost-intervention assessment points, average baseline andpost-
intervention scores were constructed. The results of within-subjects
ANOVAs comparing these periods are presented in Table 3. As
shown, there was a signiﬁcant improvement in belief ﬂexibility:
PBM (p¼ 0.01) and delusional conviction (p¼ 0.01), and also a trend
towards improved reasoning (p¼ 0.07) at post-intervention. Change
in data gathering between baseline and post-intervention was also
calculated according to participants’ JTC status at baseline. Partici-
pants who were classiﬁed as showing the JTC bias at baseline
requested an additionalmean of 1.17 (1.91) beads. Thosewhodid not
JTC at baseline requested an additional mean of 0.57 (1.21) beads.
3.4. Participant feedback
Mean ratings on the 0e10 visual analogue scales for enjoyment
(mean ¼ 8.77, sd ¼ 1.54, range ¼ 5e10), usefulness (mean ¼ 9.38,
sd ¼ 1.04, range ¼ 7e10) and interest of the programme
(mean ¼ 9.08, sd ¼ 1.44, range ¼ 5e10) were all high. Participants’
responses to open-ended questions about the programme were all
positive, and follow-up feedback indicated that they had under-
stood the key training points and a number of participants were
able to make links with their own reasoning style. However, there
were some participants who did not report changes in their own
reasoning style relating to their delusional belief. Participants’
comments were recorded verbatim and examples are provided in
Table 4.
4. Discussion
The study was designed as an initial test of the efﬁcacy of an
enhanced computerised training package targeting reasoning
processes in delusions. Thirteen participants with severe and long-
Fig. 1. Examples of slides from the Training Programme: Task Four.
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very high levels of delusional conviction, low levels of belief ﬂexi-
bility and half of whom had a tendency to jump to conclusions.
Approximately half of the participants had not responded to CBT in
the past, in terms of their delusional experience. The current
sample is therefore one that is resistant to change using either
traditional CBT for psychosis and/or antipsychotic medication.
The training programme was well received by participants.
Ratings of enjoyment, usefulness and interest of the programme
were high, and comments made at post-training were very posi-
tive. The results of the statistical analyses support the hypothesisedimpact of training on outcomes. When comparing the average
baseline and post-intervention periods there were signiﬁcant
improvements in belief ﬂexibility and delusional conviction, both of
which had large effect sizes; and a small effect on reasoning (Cohen,
1992), although this did not reach signiﬁcance.
As intended, these changes are larger than those reported by
Ross et al. (2009) for both delusional conviction and belief ﬂexi-
bility. Furthermore, Ross et al. (2009) achieved a reduction in
delusional conviction in approximately 17% of participants,
whereas the present study achieved a reduction in almost 62% of
participants at post-intervention. In terms of belief ﬂexibility, in the
Table 1
Clinical and demographic information: means (SD) and numbers of participants
(n ¼ 13).
Age 44.6 (10.2) years
Sex 7 Male
6 Female
Ethnicity 6 (46.2%) White
4 (30.8%) Black African
1 (7.7%) Black Caribbean
1 (7.7%) Asian
1 (7.7%) Other
Diagnosis 7 (53.8%) Schizophrenia
4 (30.8%) Schizo-Affective Disorder
1 (7.7%) Delusional Disorder
1 (7.7%) Unspeciﬁed Nonorganic
Psychosis
Duration of illness 16.73 (9.1) years
Self-reported duration
of primary delusion
13.75 (7.5) years
Previous experience of CBT 12 (92.3%)
Medication 13 (100%)
Participants showing the JTC bias 6 (46.2%)
Full scale IQ 88.93 (16.4)
DASS total score 55.23 (24.02)
PANSS positive symptom scale 22.92 (3.90)
PSYRATS total score 17.77 (2.68)
Key: DASS ¼ Depression Anxiety Stress Scales; PANSS ¼ Positive and Negative
Syndrome Scale; PSYRATS ¼ Psychotic Symptoms Rating Scale.
Table 3
Mean Scores (sd) and statistical analysis of key outcomes across baseline and post-
intervention periods (n ¼ 13).
Baseline Post-intervention F Df P Effect size
(Cohen’s d*)
No. of beads
requested
4.00 (2.94) 4.85 (2.75) 3.96 1, 12 0.07 0.30
% Conviction 98.23 (4.62) 83.23 (18.58) 8.52 1, 12 0.01 1.06
Belief
ﬂexibility:
PBM
10.87 (16.62) 27.31 (22.04) 11.07 1, 12 0.01 0.82
Key: PBM ¼ Possibility of Being Mistaken.
*Cohen’s d calculated using group means & pooled SD (Dunlap et al., 1996).
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either one (n ¼ 3) or two (n ¼ 1) of the three items between pre-
and post-training, whereas in the present study, six out of 13
participants gave ﬂexible responses to all three items at post-
intervention. There were also promising results in terms of data
gathering. Although the overall mean increase in beads to decision
was greater in the Ross et al. (2009) study (mean¼ 2.1 beads), more
detailed analysis of that study highlighted that change was greater
in participants who did not JTC from the outset (mean ¼ 4.00,
sd ¼ 4.04), with a much smaller improvement in participants who
showed the JTC bias at baseline (mean ¼ 0.44, sd ¼ 2.13). In
contrast, the present study found a slightly greater increase in
beads to decision between baseline and post-intervention periods
in those participants who showed the JTC bias at baseline
(mean ¼ 1.17, sd ¼ 1.91), in comparison to those who did not JTC
(mean ¼ 0.57, sd ¼ 1.21).
We expected that the lengthier programme with the addition of
more real-life scenarios and interactive elements would help
participants to generalise training points to their own experiences.
This is supported by some of the commentsmade during completion
of the training and outcome measures. Further, participants’
comments both during and at post-training suggested that the
addition of real-life scenarios and the use of multimedia to illustrate
key points were particularly useful and engaging. This aspect of the
package was designed to illustrate how people can JTC in the real
world,with the aimof helping participants to generalize key training
points to their own delusional experiences, in addition to the moreTable 2
Mean scores (sd) and numbers of participants on key outcomes across time points.
Baseline
Probabilistic reasoning task: mean no. of beads requested (sd) 4.08 (3
Probabilistic reasoning task: number showing JTC bias (% of total) 6 (4
Mean % conviction (sd) 99.15 (2
Belief ﬂexibility: mean PBM (sd) 8.65 (1
Belief ﬂexibility: no. of participants showing positive RTHC (% of total) 1 (7
Belief ﬂexibility: number of EoE (% of total) 2 (1
Key: JTC ¼ Jumping to Conclusions; PBM ¼ Possibility of Being Mistaken; RTHC ¼ Reactabstract tasks used by Ross et al. (2009). This did appear to be the
case, with participants often commenting on the personal relevance
of particular examples, but ﬁnding it helpful and less distressing to
think about more neutral explanations. This idea of helping patients
to think of a greater number of explanations for their experiences
has appeared helpful in previous research. For example, Levine,
Barak, and Granek (1998) suggest that their group intervention
was able to target delusional conviction through ﬁrst creating a state
of cognitive dissonance and then helping participants to ﬁnd a range
of feasible explanations in addition to the delusional one.
It should be noted that the study was designed as an initial
exploratory study, with the aims of establishing the acceptability
and feasibility of the training programme. Although a control
period was included in order to assess the stability of key outcome
measures before the intervention and thus provide greater conﬁ-
dence that change post-intervention was not as a result of the
instability of the variables being measured, the study did not
include an independent control group and was not powered to
detect change in key outcomes. This will clearly be crucial in future
evaluation of the programme. There were a number of additional
limitations to the present study, which should be addressed in
future evaluation. As the study was a small pilot, there was no
independent assessor: the assessments and therapy were carried
out by the same researcher. Whilst they conducted the assessments
according to protocol, there is a possibility that the results were
inﬂuenced by experimenter bias and/or demand characteristics.
Future studies would beneﬁt from the use of a blind, independent
assessor for both qualitative and quantitative outcomes. Secondly,
due to the nature of the sample, whereby over 60% of participants
were recruited via a local team specialising in CBTp, the majority of
participants already had some experience of CBT. It is difﬁcult to
assess how this may have impacted on the results. On one hand it
suggests that previous CBT did not lead to long-term reductions in
particular delusional beliefs, however it may mean that the sample
recruited were more socialised to the CBT model and may have
beneﬁtted more than a sample with little or no experience of CBT.
Again, this possibility should be addressed in future studies,
particularly as it will determine whether the programme could be
used as a stand-alone therapy or as part of a course of CBT.1 Baseline 2 Post-intervention 1 Post-intervention 2
.17) 3.92 (2.81) 4.69 (3.01) 5.00 (3.00)
6.2%) 5 (38.5%) 3 (23.1%) 3 (23.1%)
.76) 97.31 (8.32) 80.77 (31.22) 85.69 (27.99)
1.29) 13.08 (27.50) 30.77 (31.48) 23.85 (22.19)
.7%) 3 (23.1%) 5 (38.5%) 10 (76.9%)
5.4%) 3 (23.1%) 5 (38.5%) 6 (46.2%)
ion to Hypothetical Contradiction; EoE ¼ Belief Flexibility.
Table 4
Examples of participant comments on the Training Programme.
Immediately after training (Post-intervention 1)
‘The programme made me question things more. I know I do JTC and will try not to in the future. I know to ask questions ﬁrst and that there could be other explanations.’
‘I learnt a lot of things e I have to gather a lot of evidence before I JTC. I can jump to negative conclusions, but there could be an innocent solution. I should look at possible
positive and neutral solutions and not allow negative emotions to rule over me.’
‘I’ve never really thought about JTC before and it highlighted how easy it is to JTC in life. I will try to take my time in judging a situation and try to get all the facts ﬁrst.’
‘It was quite simple. I learned to slow down and think carefully about the situation and be more hesitant. In the future I will be very hesitant about coming to a ﬁxed
conclusion.’
Follow-up (Post-intervention 2)
Examples of Positive Change:
‘I noticed myself jumping to conclusions. A woman was walking round the estate. Under normal circumstances I would have found this really dodgy, but I asked a neighbour
who’d been out gardening and she told me she was looking for her lost cat. I felt a lot better then.’
‘When I see people laughing and talking about me I try thinking that I’m jumping to conclusions. When I see people with mobiles I’ve been trying to give them the beneﬁt
of the doubt e they might be taking pictures of me, but they might not. It’s less distressing thinking like this.’
‘I have tried to think about things rationally e I’m not that important, it would be too expensive (to be under surveillance). There are issues with liberties and civil rights.
The noises I hear could be a sign I’m under surveillance, but they could also be hallucinations or the neighbours.’
‘I’ve been trying to slow down my thinking and be a bit more careful with my thoughts.before I react to something. Perhaps it is to do with my brain and what I’m
thinking rather than the devil. Or it could be a day dream or something bigger that is controlling me e.g. God or aliens.’
Examples of No Change:
‘I’m deﬁnitely under surveillance. I’m paying double for drugs and being cheated. The police are involved and they want me to know they’re following me. I saw a
security van and there’s no other reason they would be there.’
‘I feel that people are deﬁnitely laughing at me and talking about me. I see this for myself, and they were quiet until I came by. I’m totally convinced.’
H. Waller et al. / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 42 (2011) 414e421420Not all participants showed quantitative changes in key
outcomes or qualitative changes in their reasoning styles following
training. This outcome has been found in previous work targeting
delusional beliefs, where only a proportion of participants were
found to reduce conviction following cognitive therapy (Jakes,
Rhodes, & Turner, 1999). It will be interesting to explore reasons
for this in future studies. For example, several participants reported
qualitative changes in less strongly held delusions, which were not
formally rated on measures in the present study. Therefore, it may
be useful to assess and rate multiple delusions, where present, in
future work in order to gain a greater understanding of any changes
which may occur following training. Further, the current sample
was too small to control for certain factors, such as intellectual
functioning, although inspection of the data did not appear to
suggest that this was a likely factor. However there has been some
suggestion in the literature that IQ may play a role in JTC (e.g Van
Dael et al., 2006).
Overall, the results suggest that the programme holds promise
in changing, over a single session, outcomes which are typically
resistant to standard treatments. Additionally, the programme is
relatively easy to administer andmay hold potential to be delivered
by ‘non-expert’ staff following brief training. As an uncontrolled
case series, the results provide a preliminary analysis which will
guide future research, including providing an initial estimate of
effect sizes for future larger-scale studies. Taking delusional
conviction and belief ﬂexibility as the most clinically relevant
outcomes, and comparing between two independent groups
(p ¼ 0.05; power ¼ 80%), a sample size of at least 26 per group
would be required to reliably detect change (Cohen,1992). If similar
positive effects are found, it may be that the programme is used in
combination with more generic CBT for psychosis interventions in
order to improve overall efﬁcacy.Acknowledgements
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